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ABSTRAK
Artikel ini membahas politik distributif bersifat programatik pada masa pandemi COVID-19 pada lingkup desa-desa di Kabupaten Sampang. Pertanyaan yang diangkat adalah bagaimana bentuk pemanfaatan sumber daya berbasis barang-barang programatik
(programmatic goods) pada masa pandemi COVID-19 di wilayah pedesaan Kabupaten
Sampang. Artikel ini memilih metode penelitian kualitatif dan mengambil studi kasus
sepuluh desa di Kabupaten Sampang. Asumsi pemilihan lokasi desa berdasarkan kemudahan proses penelitian saat pandemi dan Sampang mempertahankan status wilayah
zona hijau paling lama di Jawa Timur. Artikel ini menunjukkan relasi kekuasaan bupati
dengan kepala desa bergeser dari cenderung transaksional saat situasi normal menjadi
kolaboratif saat menghadapi krisis pandemi. Studi ini juga memverifikasi konsep politik
programatik di Sampang dengan fokus tiga syarat berikut, yaitu ketepatan penerima
manfaat, keterbukaan informasi, dan komitmen pelaksanaan tanpa diskriminasi. Studi
ini menemukan pula bahwa kepala desa berperan sebagai broker yang efektif berdasarkan implementasi program-program kesejahteraan desa yang dikaitkan dengan
penanganan pandemi, seperti posko relawan desa lawan COVID-19, masker gratis
bagi warga desa, penyaluran BLT- Dana Desa (BLT-DD) untuk warga desa miskin dan
terdampak pandemic, pembagian paket sembako, akses internet gratis di setiap desa
Kata kunci: Politik distributif, barang-barang programatik, pandemi, COVID-19.
ABSTRACT
This article discusses programmatic distributive politics in the villages in Sampang
Regency during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study seeks to answer the forms of programmatic goods distributed in Sampang during the pandemic. This study employs
qualitative methods and chose ten villages in Sampang as its case study due to Sampang’s achievement in maintaining its green zone status for the longest period in East
Java. This article shows that there have been shifts in the bupati’s relationships with
the village heads, from what was previously transactional prior to the pandemic to be
The author is a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UPN “Veteran” East
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more collaborative in efforts to contain the spread of the virus. This study also finds
that the practice of distributive politics in Sampang during the pandemic fulfills the
three criteria of programmatic politics: the accuracy of beneficiaries, transparency, and
commitment to distribute goods without discrimination. The village heads in Sampang
have acted as effective brokers in the implementation of village welfare programs, such
as the installment of village volunteer posts against COVID-19, the free mask program
for villagers, the BLT-Village Fund (BLT-DD) scheme targeting villagers from low-income
households affected by the pandemic, the distribution of staple foods (sembako), the
smart village program that provides free internet access in every village.
Keywords: Distributive politics, programmatic goods, pandemic, COVID-19.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v7i1.343

I N T RODUC T ION

In Indonesia, village heads (kepala desa) are expected to accumulate
power resources and be highly respected by the community. The possession of power resources shapes the strength of village heads’ influence
in their villages. These power resources include religious knowledge
(particularly Islam), expertise and skills, martial arts and mysticism,
material wealth, social work, and social positions or status (Iberamsjah
2002, 75). As formal elites, village heads are hierarchically pushed to
realize programs instructed from above, such as district heads (camat)
and regents (bupati). However, on the other hand, their positions as
informal elites require them to develop their own initiative to improve
their villages. This means that village heads’ statuses are not only affected by their formal authority, but also their traditional positions as
bapak pelindung (godfathers) for their people (Tjiptoherijanto and Prijono 1983, 38).
The role of bapak pelindung is needed when villagers face danger,
such as the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. This particular
role is vital in Java, which has been badly hit by the virus, with as many
as 4,623 positive cases—just a little below Jakarta, which has 7,229 cases—as of May 30, 2020 (Bayhaqi 2020). The spike in positive cases did
not only occur at provincial level, but also at city and regency levels. In
East Java, there is at least one region that has been relatively successful
in handling COVID-19: the Sampang Regency. Therefore, this study
thus chooses to use Sampang as its case study to investigate the role of
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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village heads during the pandemic in relation to their connection to
village residents and higher bureaucratic and political structures.
Sampang was able to maintain its green zone status (meaning an
absence of confirmed positive cases) for the longest time compared to
other areas in the province. The regency’s first positive case—one person—was announced on May 13, 2020. The following graph captures
the spread of the virus in Sampang:

Figure 1. COVID-19 Cases in Sampang. Source: Sampang Government n.d.

Bupati of Sampang, Slamet Junaidi, said that the success to maintain
the green zone status was due to his government’s commitment in tracking both those who were at risk (Orang Dalam Resiko, ODR) and those
under health monitoring (Orang Dalam Pemantauan, ODP) down to
the village level. The Bupati also implemented a monitoring strategy
called blusukan (unplanned visitations). He added that impromptu
health checks were also commonly carried out at the regency, district,
and village/sub-district levels. Checks at the later levels were done by
village officials, medics from the puskesmas (community health centers)
and village paramedics. Even the Bhabinkamtibmas (community police
officers) and Babinsa (non-commissioned officers stationed in villages)
were involved directly in these strategies (Taufiqurrahman 2020).
These programs were first implemented to anticipate the spread of
COVID-19 and began with village heads’ instructions to follow Circular
Letter of Bupati Sampang No. 440/655/434.203/2020 on Precaution and
Prevention of COVID-19. The policy encourages heads of villages to
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distribute free masks and, in doing so, involves the production efforts of
local small and medium-sized enterprises. Village heads were also permitted to utilize village funds (dana desa) to handle COVID-19 (Basri
2020). In fact, the bupati immediately instructed the village heads in
Sampang to use their village funds to ensure that the people were safe
and, more specifically, to prioritize policies aimed at containing the
spread of the virus (Hidayat 2020).
Thus, we can say that the success of the responses to the pandemic
in Sampang was heavily shaped by the role that the village heads played
in implementing the regional government’s policies. In Indonesia, village heads and officials are vital for implementing social welfare programs (Aspinall and Rohman 2017). For example, they take part in
identifying the recipients of public goods and their distribution. The
enlarging role of the village head was influenced by changes in political conditions in Indonesia. The power relationships between village
elites and supra-village structures in Reformasi Era have changed; they
were no longer as rigidly hierarchical as they were during the New
Order. After Reformasi, these relationships were more mutual; while
village heads were dependent on those structurally above the district
heads and bupati, their superior officials were also dependent on village
elites. Village heads have become more involved in pursuing government projects and acted as brokers in distributing resources for village
development as well as the maintenance of political power (Aspinall
and Rohman 2017, 52).
This article aims to elaborate on the success of the village heads
in Sampang in implementing COVID-19 policies. More specifically,
this article examines how public officials distributed resources through
policies during the pandemic and contributed to Sampang’s overall
achievement. To explore how resources are allocated through policy
enactment at the village level, this article employs the concept of distributive politics. Simply put, this concept indicates that political power
(through its political institutions: the executive and legislative) works
as avenues for politicians to distribute and allocate resources. What is
meant by resources is any item that enables or empowers people in their
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v7i1.343
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power relationships with the authority, which may be publicly elected
politicians or bureaucrats. These resources may be viewed in both material and social terms (Wardani 2014).
There are two forms of distributive politics: programmatic and nonprogrammatic politics (Stokes et al. 2013). Previous studies on distributive politics in Indonesia tended to focus on non-programmatic goods—
clientelism and partisan bias. Several of these literature studies depict
this phenomenon in the context of political contestation (Aspinall and
Sukmajati 2015; Haliim 2019; Palenewen 2014; Saragintan and Hidayat
2016). In elections, political parties or candidates will usually promise
new policies that can bring material benefits for specific groups or
classes. The benefits include, but are not limited to, fertilizers, farming
subsidies, pension raises for the elderly, and scholarships for students
from low-income families—some of these falls under the category of
programmatic goods (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015, 30).
The study conducted by Palenewen (2014) focused on patronage
between candidates and voters during the legislative election in Bitung.
This study looked at clientelistic strategies of non-programmatic politics: patronage, vote-buying, and constituency service. Voters who did
not cast their votes for the candidates practicing these strategies were
denied material benefits. Palenewen’s (2014) study shows that most nonprogrammatic strategies employed by candidates have been relatively
successful in bringing victory. Due to this finding, Palanewen (2014)
did not inquire into programmatic strategies.
Two other studies looked at the partisan bias in the non-programmatic distribution in Banten (Saragintan and Hidayat 2016) and Kediri
(Haliim 2019). They captured the process of resource allocation in the
form of grants and social aid, which could be categorized as pork-barrel
politics. What was unique from the Banten case was that these grants
and aid were targeted towards religion-based groups. In the case of
Kediri, the grants were not specifically targeted for certain groups but
were rather seen as political maneuvers that incumbents employed nearing election day. Incumbents promised to increase the amount of funds
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for social aid through Prodamas (community empowerment program)
up to 100% if they were re-elected.
These studies demonstrate that non-programmatic distributions have
high degrees of transactional characteristics, at least when viewed from
the expectations of the regional elites enacting the distributive policies.
This paper takes a different position by inquiring into the programmatic
kind of distributive politics. More specifically, it shows that when public
officials—in this case village heads—are faced with the dangers of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the distribution of resources tends to be more
programmatic. This study looks at the pandemic’s effects on the village
elites’ decisions in distributing goods, particularly medical equipment
through programs that aimed to control the pandemic, as well as working collaboratively—rather than transactionally—with the supra-village
structures. Here we base our analysis on the handling of the pandemic
in ten villages in Sampang, which was supported by information obtained the bupati and the officials of the ten villages under study.
T H E T H EORY OF DIS T R I BU T I V E P OL I T ICS A N D
T H E CONCEP T OF PRO GR A M M AT IC G O ODS

The concept of distributive politics emphasizes the type of available
resources, which political actors typically distribute through policy
programs. These programs provide material and social incentives for
people’s obedience and support (Hidayat, Prasetyo, and Yuwana 2018).
Thus, the distribution of resources through the public policy model is
highly intertwined with the interests of political actors. As previously
discussed, Wardani (2014) defined distributive politics as an arena of
resource allocation and distribution. These resources are defined as any
item that may enable or empower people in their power relationships
with other parties, such as politicians and public officials.
Thus, politics is inevitably highly intertwined with the distribution of
resources. The distribution of resources in politics is even deemed more
dynamic than the distribution of market goods from an economic perspective. In democratic states, there are agreements (though they may
not be in the form of consensus) that the political authority possesses
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v7i1.343
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the right to do inter-generational distribution of resources through tax,
which funds education or social safety nets. There are also agreements
for distributing resources through welfare programs of the provision
or jobs (Stokes et al. 2013). Nevertheless, simultaneously, distributing
resources to build and strengthen political ties with private companies
and giving cash in exchange for votes have also been widely criticized.
This shows that the distribution of resources in politics, on the one
hand, is deemed widely acceptable by society. However, on the other
hand, it is also condemned to the extent that many perpetrators have
been criminally charged, particularly those taking part in vote-buying
(Stokes et al. 2013).
Nic Cheeseman et al. (2014) said that programmatic politics is a vital
part of electoral contestation. This approach is used when (typically
incumbent) candidates (of political parties) emphasize the successes of
their past policies that served the public interest as well as the political
promises for the next term, with the hopes of gaining votes in upcoming
elections. Thus, political actors do not rely solely on identity-based political strategies (usually based on ethnicity and religion), charisma, and
patronage. Parties that employ programmatic political strategies usually
do not only offer public policies that are in accordance with people’s
aspirations and interests, but also the parties’ ideologies (Cheeseman et
al. 2014). Kitschelt (1995) and Stokes (2007) differentiate programmatic
politics and clientelism based on the beneficiaries of public policy (for
example, health insurance, loans, and subsidized housing). In programmatic politics, beneficiaries are decided upon based on whether they
fulfill the formal criteria to receive the goods and not because of their
political affiliations. Clientelist politics, on the other hand, distribute
goods mainly to the benefactors’ supporters. The main difference is
that candidates who practice programmatic politics distribute resources
indiscriminately, even to those who support their rivals, while actors
exercising non-programmatic politics do not (Mas’udi and Kurniawan
2017).
The concept of distributive politics says that the programmatic distribution of goods is done through government or state policies. It is
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021
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thus reasonable that distributive politics of this kind is more commonly
carried out by incumbents aiming to run again for the next term (Harjanta 2018).
How can we analyze whether programmatic politics has been practiced during the COVID-19 pandemic in Sampang? This paper elaborates the indicators of programmatic goods to analyze this practice in
the case of Sampang. As previously indicated, we shall elaborate these
criteria by referring to Stoke’s (2009, 10) theories and Aspinall and Sukmajati’s (2015, 30) findings. The first is that the formulation of the
policy’s aims is open to public debate. The second is that the distribution rules are official and public. Third, the actual distribution of goods
follows the public criteria that have been made. The following figure
illustrates the distribution of resources done by the government to the
public (Stokes et al. 2013, 31):
Figure 2. The Concept of Distribute Politics

Source: Stokes et al. (2013).

https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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The above figure shows that there are two forms of distributive politics: programmatic and non-programmatic politics. This study mainly
aims to capture the distribution of programmatic goods in Sampang.
The implementation of programmatic policies requires brokers, not to
mobilize political support but rather mediate or bridge the interests of
candidates and those of voters. Brokers play the role of gathering information, including regarding the problems that the people are facing—
and in this case, particularly the needs of villagers who were impacted
by COVID-19. The information that has been gathered would later
be used to formulate solutions, which take the form of public policies.
Before the pandemic, studies on programmatic goods in Asian countries have also been carried out, such as in Japan (Catalinac 2015) and
India (Wyatt 2013). In Japan’s case, there has been a rise in campaigns
for programmatic policies, mainly by LDP politicians, who focused on
national security. One factor behind the popularization of programmatic politics in Japan is the change in Japan’s electoral laws back
in 1994. This shows that the rise of programmatic politics is not only
shaped by voters’ preferences. Catalinac (2015) also found that both
incumbent and opposition candidates have tended to rely on programmatic politics in the past few years.
The case of Tamil Nadu, India, shows a shift in the distribution
of goods, from previously clientelistic to highly programmatic. For
the past six years, two of the largest parties in Tamil Nadu, All India
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kashagam (AIADMK) and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), have been adopting programmatic politics.
For example, the two parties provided free health insurance, affordable
housing, and protection from the expropriation of slum areas. The two
parties also opened shops that handed out free food and sold some commodities at affordable prices in the villages and cities. This program
is known to provide food subsidies through the Public Distribution
(PDS) program, in which the recipients were those who fell under the
category of beneficiaries of programmatic policies. Party officials also
implemented the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and
MGR Nutritious Noon Meal Scheme (NNMS). The ICDS aimed to
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021
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improve nutrition for infants, pregnant women, and breastfeeding mothers, while the NNMS provided free meals for school-aged children in
Tamil Nadu (Wyatt 2013).
This article offers a new perspective from the previous studies on
programmatic politics, particularly in Japan and India, by looking into
the most recent developments during the COVID-19 pandemic. One
of the things that differentiate this situation from that of other contexts
is its emergency and need for rapid and precise responses, which place
political motives—which are usually at the center of non-programmatic
politics—at the lowest end of the priority. Secondly, in the context of
Indonesia, we mainly focus on programmatic politics, offering a different angle from those of the previous studies on distributive politics,
which have tended to investigate the non-programmatic kind. Palenewen (2014) analyzed the process of resource allocation by elites and
their parties—which used three methods: pork barrel politics, money
politics, and constituency service—in the legislative elections in the
city of Bitung. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2015) found five variations of
patronage in non-programmatic distribution of resources during legislative elections in Indonesia. Saragintan and Hidayat’s (2016) study
on non-programmatic allocation of resources categorized the grants
and social aid given out in Banten as a form of pork barrel politics that
targeted religious groups. This article, thus, takes a different angle from
the more established research of non-programmatic politics, as this
study inquiries into programmatic distributive politics.
R ESE A RCH M E T HODS

This study employs a qualitative approach and conducts a case study
of 10 villages in Sampang, East Java. This case is selected because of
the uniqueness of Sampang as it succeeded in maintaining the green
zone status for the longest in the province. Another reason is that we
have been acquainted with the informants, which eased our process of
obtaining research permits and gathering data during the pandemic.
This article provides a descriptive analysis to present a detailed illustration of the phenomenon under study. As Denzin and Lincoln stated,
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities
and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount,
intensity, or frequency. Qualitative researchers stress the socially
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the
researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that
shape inquiry. (Denzin and Lincoln 2009, 10)
The phenomenon under study is the distribution of programmatic
goods by local political actors at the village level during the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the pandemic, data could not be obtained by
fieldwork in the villages where the informants reside. Thus, the technique we employed to get around this issue was conducting in-depth
interviews with informants who were familiar with the phenomenon
via telephone. These informants were the bupati of Sampang and ten
village heads in Sampang. Secondary data, such as news and documentation covering the handling of COVID-19 in Sampang, and related
literature, were also assessed.
P OW ER R E L AT IONS BE T W EEN V I L L AGE
H E A DS A N D BU PAT I I N SA M PA NG

When this article was written, regional governments were faced with
the spread of the coronavirus disease. As formal leaders, both the bupati
and village heads played a significant role in handling the pandemic
because they possessed actual and potential power resources. According
to Surbakti (2010), an individual is perceived to possess potential power
if they have power resources such as wealth, land, weaponry, and social
positions or status. An individual is said to have actual power when they
have used these power resources in political activities to achieve his or
her interests. In the case of Sampang, the public officials’ interests were
to save their people from the dangers of COVID-19.
During the crisis, the bupati and village heads were the local elites
who collaborated to contain the spread of COVID-19. This emergency
circumstance made their interactions inevitable. The pattern of interac-
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tions and power relations between them was always present in implementing COVID-19 policies in the regency. Through his research on
relations between village heads and the state, Nordholt (1987, 199) finds
that village heads experience a duality of positions. On the one hand,
village heads are elected by villages, which makes them accountable
and necessitates them to cater to their villagers’ interests. On the other
hand, they are government officials whose job is to ensure the implementation of government policies.
An observation of the development of government regulations on villages from the New Order to the reformasi era reveals that the relationship between village heads and the state fluctuates depending on the
political constellation between the central and local governments. This
is because power relationships between political actors are influenced
by the settings in which they exercise their powers. We shall now turn
to the patterns of power relationships between village heads and the
bupati to thoroughly illustrate this matter.
During the New Order, the state positioned villages as ‘objects of
co-optation’ in its hegemonic style of politics through Law No. 5/1979.
This law sustained the power of the New Order through centralization
and stability and made the government structure hierarchical. Such a
structure weakened the village, rendering it the lowest-level government unit and hindering its autonomy. The uniformity of villages could
also mean that the power relationships between the regents and village
heads were unequal in both their administrative and political aspects.
Tjiptoherijanto and Prijono (1983) further explained that, in relation
to their supra-village authorities, village heads tended to lose the traditional authority that mandated them to act as bapak pelindung to
their villagers and initiators of their villages’ democracy. Consequently,
village heads became more dependent on the supra-village structures.
During the reform era, decentralization created a shift in power relations, not only between the central and local governments, but also between villages and their higher authorities. Law No. 22/1999 treated the
village as an autonomous institution. Although the law did not explicitly
state that the village has its own government structure, its recognition
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v7i1.343
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of the village’s historical and traditional rights meant that the village
was recognized as an autonomous and legal entity (Maschab 2013, 141).
This new definition not only positioned village heads as bureaucratic
extensions of the supra-village structures (district heads, bupati, etc.) but
also made the village head a political one. This amendment had implications for the power relations between the bupati and village head.
The village head tended to be autonomous in running his government,
and the bupati supervision was limited to administrative matters.
In the post-reformasi era, villages were regulated under Law No.
32/2004. Village governance was improved through the recentralization
of administrative affairs and the increase of the village’s institutional
capacity, which was previously semi-autonomous, such as the appointment of the village secretary as a state employee. Another new rule was
that district heads were no longer above village heads, nor were they
the direct ‘supervisor’ (pembina) of village governance. It was the bupati
who held this role and had the authority to appoint village heads (Maschab 2013, 151). Therefore, the relationship between the bupati and
the village head became dominative-semi-autonomous. This is because
the village head became accountable to the bupati, and, in return, the
bupati needed the village head to maintain his/her power.
Table 1: Power Relations between the Village Heads and Bupati
Period

Law/Regulation

Regulated Matters

New Order

Law No.5/1979 on Village
Governance

Centralization

Reformation

Law No. 22/1999 on Regional
Governance
Law No. 32/2004 on Regional
Governance
Law No. 06/2014 on Villages

DecentralizationAutonomy
Autonomy- Limited

PostReformation

DecentralizationAutonomy

Relationship
Type
DominationSubordinate
SupervisionAutonomy
Dominationsemi- autonomy
DependencyTransactional

Note: Compiled from various sources.

The enactment of the most recent Law No. 6/2014 further improved
the village head’s leverage in local politics. Aspinall and Rohman (2017)
said that village heads act as brokers of supra-village programs and effective vote-getters during elections, particularly when the villagers depend
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upon the village heads for government aid and welfare programs. Thus,
the strengthening of the village head’s bargaining power contributes to
the interdependent relationship between the village head and the bupati. This form of relationship is also similar to that of the transactional
style of leadership.
The problems that occurred during the pandemic demand that
regents and village heads realize programs effectively to prevent the
spread of the virus. The interactions between the two were evident
when the bupati issued a circular letter to all village heads, asking them
to increase their awareness of the risks of COVID-19. In this circular
letter, the bupati instructed all village heads to immediately utilize
their village funds for COVID-19 handling at the village level (Basri
2020). As political elites, they need to formulate effective policies, and
successful implementation requires highly committed local leaders. As
previously explained, the shift in elite power relationships after the reformasi affected the relationships between village heads and the state (i.e.,
heads of districts and regents), making them more mutually dependent
upon each other and allowing them to be more transactional (table 1).
Aspinall and Rohman (2017) highlighted the shifts in power relationships since the enactment of Law No. 6/2014, where the relationships
between village heads and the state have become more fluid from what
was previously more rigid and hierarchical. Village heads now have
more leverage in politics because while they need the bupati, the bupati
also needs the village heads’ support.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the relationship between the
bupati and village leaders became relatively more equal due to the
collaboration between them in handling the virus. As explained by
the head of Taman Village, Sampang’s achievement in maintaining
its green zone status was heavily shaped by the role of both the people
and government.
“I particularly appreciate Pak Bupati (of) Sampang. He has been
very motivated in visiting the villages, even up until 2:00 AM. He
even went to the areas bordering Sampang and Bangkalan. All these
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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borders were consistently monitored by the bupati. He also monitored the implementation of both the programs from the Sampang
government and village heads. So, I did not only hear about the
hard work of the Sampang government; I experienced it myself.”.
(Muarif, Head of Taman Village, May 15, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang)
The Sampang bupati said that his region’s achievement in maintaining
its green zone status for the most prolonged period in East Java was a
straight fact. According to him, this success was due to earlier anticipation before any formal instructions from the central government were
issued to Sampang. An example of this was the formulation of guidelines for all state employees and heads of state agencies in Sampang who
were attending meetings outside the regency as well as the obligation
to obtain permits from the bupati when they do so. He also employed
a strategy to teach and urge the people to follow physical distancing
measures, which entailed the building of three command posts (Posko)
at the regency level, fourteen at the district level, and posts in each village. The village heads worked in cooperation with community health
centers to collect data and monitor the mobility of incoming travelers,
who were regarded as persons under risk. The enactment of these procedures has contributed to Sampang’s ability to stay in the green zone
(Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020. Interviewed by
Author. Sampang).
This emergence of such collaborative power relationships between
the bupati and village heads during the pandemic was a different phenomenon from the ones found by previous studies, which showed relationships during ‘normal times’ and are more transactional or used
to serve the self-interests of those of certain groups and party elites
(Aspinall and Rohman 2017; Kuncoro 2013; Muslim 2016, 76). As a local political elite, the bupati acknowledges that he is not able to control
the spread of COVID-19 without the involvement of the village heads.
Similarly, the village heads need support from the regency to protect
their villagers from the virus in the form of government programs. If
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the village heads fail keeping their villagers safe, they may lose their
influence in their respective villages. Thus, if the previous relationships
between the village heads and bupati were transactional, they have
shifted to become more collaborative during the pandemic. If they
succeed in containing the spread of the virus and maintain their green
zone status, their legitimacy will be strengthened.
PRO GR A M M AT IC G O ODS DU R I NG
T H E PA N DEM IC I N SA M PA NG

In the previous sections, we have discussed that programmatic goods
refer to resources distributed by regional governments to aid the people,
particularly, in this context, those heavily impacted by COVID-19 in
Sampang. These programs were ideally formulated based on problems
identified by the village authority, followed by the village heads’ recommendation of programmatic goods, which were then sent to the
supra-village structures or regency government. If we view this from a
distributive politics perspective, programmatic politics is different from
the practice of patronage-clientelism, which is defined as the distribution of goods with the intention of getting votes or winning elections.
Programmatic goods, on the other hand, are not distributed to mobilize
the electorate.
Patronage falls under the category of non-programmatic politics.
Several examples of this practice include the provision of cash, goods,
services, and other economic benefits (e.g., employment or contracts)
from politicians’ own finances or pork barrel projects (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2014). Conversely, programmatic goods during the pandemic—
such as healthcare—were more targeted towards the villagers’ safety.
Here we further elaborate that programmatic distributive politics
consists of three criteria. First is the accuracy of the programs’ beneficiaries. The second is the open nature of the information on the programs
formulated to address public problems. The third is the commitment
to implement programs without discrimination.
The Sampang government implemented several strategies in combating COVID-19. These included the bupati’s immediate instruction
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
DOI: 10.7454/jp.v7i1.343

16

Hidayat and Susilo: Refusing to Die: Programmatic Goods in the Fight against COVID-19
REFUSING TO DIE: PROGRAMMATIC GOODS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COVID-19

63

for village heads to make use of the available resources to contain the
spread of COVID-19. These instructions were based on the Minister
of Villages’ Regulation No. 6/2020 on the Prioritization of the Use
of Village Funds, allowing village authorities to use village funds to
handle COVID-19 (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020.
Interviewed by Author. Sampang). Village authorities receive dana desa
(DD) not only from the central government—through the Ministry of
Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration—
but also from the regional budget through alokasi dana desa (ADD).
Using the theory of distributive politics, the DD and ADD can be
categorized as material resources for the medical countermeasures and
the mitigation of economic impacts for villagers who lost their income.
In the context of public policy, it is part of the strategic utilization of
resources to mitigate public problems. It is also one of the forms of
continuous intervention by the government to cater to the interests of
the vulnerable and help them survive and participate in the governance
(Chandler and Plano 1988). Table 2 below shows that there has been an
increase in the allocation of ADD and DD in Sampang during the COVID-19 pandemic, compared to the funding in the two previous years.
Table 2. ADD and DD Allocation in Sampang, from 2018–2020
Component
2018
Alokasi Dana Desa (ADD) 89,064,000,000
Dana Desa (DD)
179,206,655,000

2019
94,029,837,000
232,543,589,000

2020
94,449,560,000
233,187,661,000

Note: Compiled from various sources.

The distribution of material resources through DD and ADD required
executors. In this case, they were the village heads who acted as brokers for these government programs and held strategic positions in the
distribution of resources (through these programs) during the pandemic. This is because the Ministry of Villages, through Regulation No.
6/2020 and Circular Letter No. 8/2020 on the COVID-19 Response
Village (Desa Tanggap COVID-19) appoints village heads as the head
of volunteers in the Desa Lawan COVID-19 (loosely translated as Villages against COVID-19) program. Village heads were also appointed
as persons in charge and tasked to gather information on villagers who
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021
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were entitled to receive direct cash transfers. Based on our interviews
with several village leaders, welfare programs for the people were not
only initiated by the state government, but also other parties such as the
military, police, and state-owned and private companies (Village Heads
in Sampang Regency, pers. comm. May 14–15, 2020).
I will now further elaborate on the distribution of programmatic
goods in Sampang during the pandemic. The first program was the
setting up of volunteer posts in every village in Sampang. The village
heads acted as the head of the villages’ volunteer team, which was
tasked to form posts as well as gather information on homecoming
travelers (also known as pemudik). These volunteers were also tasked to
socialize the four coordination agreements made between the bupati,
the Islamic clerics, and Forum Komunikasi Pimpinan Daerah (the Regional Leadership Communication Forum) in Sampang to the people.
These agreements were the prohibitions to hold imtihan1, celebrations
for Isra’ Miraj, wedding receptions, and mass gatherings that exceeded
thirty people (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang. April 14, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang). All the interviewed village heads said that
the posts were built at the village council, and there was always somebody at these posts to anticipate sudden inspections from the regency
authority, as the bupati often carried out blusukan to the villages. The
village heads said that the volunteers’ operational funds were from the
DD and ADD. These funds were used to disinfect public spaces, the
installment of washbasins and sterilization cubicles, and the provision of
logistics such as meals and cigarettes for the volunteers. Several village
heads also had to use their personal expenses to fund the operations
of the volunteer teams (Zainuddin, Head of Bapelle Village. May 14,
2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang).
The installment of posts and the formation of volunteer teams meet
the criteria of programmatic goods, particularly the criterion about the
1 Haflatul Imtihan is an act of gratitude for the end of exams. This tradition is deemed to hold
deep sociological values and consists of engaging events. The celebration is normally held by
Islamic boarding schools, but people living around the schools are also usually involved. Activities that are usually held throughout the week include religious competitions and sports, such
as poetry reading, recitation of the kitab kuning (lit: yellow book), and soccer. See Faisol 2016.
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indiscriminate nature of the distribution. An example of this is the
provision of village hotlines for emergencies. The implementation of
this policy resulted from a discussion between the village heads and
public figures in the regency. This discussion meant that information
was open and that the village heads were responsible for the socialization (sosialisasi) of the policy to their villagers. The village authority
was committed to not discriminate in its provision of these programs.
This was demonstrated in the case of Panggung Village, in which the
volunteer team was involved in arranging the funeral of a villager who
was a patient under supervision (Pasien Dalam Pengawasan or PDP)
and died in Surabaya, which was a red zone at the time. Although the
village head was harshly scolded by the Sampang government for the
burial permit, he confirmed that there had been no rejections from
his villagers about the matter as the convoy of cars that escorted the
deceased was told to return to Surabaya after the burial immediately.
They also followed the bupati’s instructions not to gather in crowds
(Subaidi, Head of Panggung Village. May 14, 2020. Interviewed by
Author. Sampang).
The second was the free masks program. Our interview with the
bupati of Sampang reveals that the funding for distributing masks at
the village level could be sourced from the village funds. Therefore,
village heads were expected to purchase cotton masks produced by local
tailors from their villages (Slamet Junaidi, Regent of Sampang, April
14, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang). This distribution was supported by each village’s volunteer team. However, several village heads
were directly involved in handing out masks to the villagers to showcase their seriousness and care. Following the bupati’s programs, the
majority of village heads provided a minimum of two washable masks,
and the production of masks was done by the villages’ local tailors,
but in the case of shortage, village authorities were able to purchase
from tailors at other villages from the same district. The implication of
this policy—apart from health-related benefits—was that it aided the
economy and helped micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises that
experienced slumps in sales due to the pandemic. These masks fall
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under the category of programmatic goods as they were provided to
all villagers without discrimination. Village heads and volunteer teams
were optimistic that the villagers were aware of the necessity of wearing
masks, especially after socialization efforts by the village authorities.
Third was the cash transfer program (Bantuan Langsung TunaiDana Desa or BLT-DD) for villagers in Sampang. The money was given
out in cash in sixty villages before Eid al-Fitr, and via bank transfer
in 120 villages after Eid. This program’s recipients were legally made
transparent, qualifying the program as a programmatic good. According
to the Minister of Villages’ Regulation No. 6/2020, villagers entitled to
receive BLT-DD are those from low income-households and are not
registered as recipients of the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) or
Bantuan Pangan Non-Tunai (BPNT) schemes, have lost their sources
of income due to COVID-19, and/or have family members who are (or
are likely to become) chronically ill.
However, it has also been asked whether there has been discrimination and a lack of transparency in the distribution of these cash transfers.
This was reflected in the demonstrations by several non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), who demanded transparency and acceleration in
the distribution of the transfers. These demonstrations were held at two
locations, the Community and Village Empowerment Agency (Dinas
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa or DPMD)—where the NGOs demanded that the head of the agency, Malik Amrullah, step down from
his position—and the Robatal District. The management of the Association of Village Heads (Asosiasi Kepala Desa or AKD) made attempts to
meet the protesting activists in a formal hearing. However, the activists
rejected the offer because their protests were directed towards the head
of the DPMD and head of the Robatal District (Regamedianews 2020).
In the case of the demonstrations at the Robatal District office,
Abdul Hamid, the head of the Robatal AKD, clarified that no discrimination has occurred during the distribution of the BLT-DD and the list
of cash recipients have been publicly discussed through musyawarah
desa, where the public could access information on who the recipients
were. He added that while the exchange between him and the demonhttps://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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strators went emotional, it was mainly a matter of communication. To
Abdul Hamid, nearly 90% of the BLT-DD transfers were accurate, and
if any mistakes happened, they were not intentional. Accidents were
possible mainly because the BLT-DD distribution almost coincided
with the gathering of additional data for the Program Keluarga Harapan
scheme from the central government. It was thus possible that some
people received both the benefits of the BLT-DD and the PKH (Abdul
Hamid, Head of the Robatal District AKD. June 13, 2020. Interviewed
by Author. Sampang).
The fourth program was the distribution of grocery packages for
villagers in Sampang. For this program, village heads organized and
gathered packages from various sources, such as the central government
(who provided the BPNT), the regency government, the police, the
military, and state as well as private companies. As brokers of this aid
program, village heads gathered data on those entitled to receive the aid
packages. This process was followed by the strategy of putting stickers
on the houses of these recipients to show that they have received the
aid. In distributing aid packages from the regency government, a ‘by
name, by address’ data-gathering scheme was used to allocate prioritized
packages for art communities in the villages. The distribution of these
packages is a form of programmatic politics because its allocation is in
accordance with the list of rightful recipients. However, several village
leaders complained that the number of packages, from both the government and other sources, was insufficient to meet everyone’s needs.
To deal with this problem, some had to use their own money to fund
additional packages. This was done out of commitment and to show
there was no discrimination in the distribution of aid, although the
village heads were reluctant to reveal who received the packages that
were bought using their personal expenses due to privacy.
The fifth was the Desa Pintar (Smart Village) program that provides
free internet to those impacted by the pandemic in Sampang. The
pandemic has made the governments of areas in the red zone enact
Large-Scale Social Restrictions (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala Besar or
PSBB), which prohibited people from going back to their hometowns.
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In the case of Sampang, village heads said that they advised their people
who were still in the red zones not to come home temporarily. People
resorted to meet virtually through the internet instead. Previously, the
Sampang government has installed internet towers in every village.
A village head said that this program has been beneficial during the
pandemic, as there has been an increase in the number of people who
communicated with their families through Whatsapp (Siban, Head of
the Disanah Village. May 14, 2020. Interviewed by Author. Sampang).
The free internet program also fulfills the criteria of the programmatic
goods. This is because all villagers were able to access its benefits. To
avoid discrimination in the provision of internet services, the regency
government has prohibited any installment of (additional) routers close
to the houses of village leaders. Nearly all the main internet towers were
built at the village councils.
The range of the signal is quite varied in the villages; in some villages, the signal was able to cover the entire village with the installment
of additional routers in every hamlet (dusun), in some the signal was
only accessible from a close distance from the village authority’s offices.
In contrast, in some others the internet connection was terribly slow
that nobody could virtually use it, such as in Labang Village and Rapa
Laok Village. All the village heads said that the free internet program
was funded through the village funds scheme. Before the formulation
and enactment of the scheme, a public discussion (musyawarah desa)
was held to socialize the program and involve the people in the process.
The conditions of the internet towers in Sampang can be observed in
the following table:
Most programmatic policies at the village level in Sampang during
the pandemic were funded through the DD and the ADD schemes.
These policies will indirectly shape political support for the incumbent
village heads and the bupati if they are to run again for public office,
with the condition that the benefits of the policies have been received
by all the members of their respective villages. The effective implementation of the programs is likely to strengthen the village heads’ and the
bupati’s legitimacy, giving them an edge in the next election.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/politik/vol7/iss1/2
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Table 3. Desa Pintar Program in Sampang
Village
Jelgung
Bapelle
Noreh
Disanah
Labang
Rapa Laok
Napo Daya
Taman
Mlaka
Panggung

District
Robatal
Robatal
Sreseh
Sreseh
Sreseh
Omben
Omben
Jrengik
Jrengik
Sampang

Tower
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning
Built – Non-functioning
Built – Non-functioning
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning
Built - Functioning

Signal Coverage
Entire village
Village council
Village council
Entire village
None
None
Village council
Village council
Village council
Village council

Sources: Interviews with the Respective Village Heads.

Interviews with the village heads and the bupati have revealed that the
primary motivation behind the channeling of the DD and the ADD
funds was programmatic rather than non-programmatic (patronage,
clientelism, and pork barrel politics). This shows that the village heads,
on the one hand, have been hierarchically accountable to the supravillage structures regarding the realization of government aid programs
for the people during the pandemic. On the other hand, they have also
maintained their informal authority as the patron for their clients—their
people—or as bapak pelindung desa by protecting their people from the
pandemic risk. These tasks were carried out through the distribution
of programmatic goods.
CONCLUSION

This article finds that Sampang’s achievement in maintaining its green
zone status for the longest period in East Java was due to the collaboration among local political elites in implementing programmatic policies to handle the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the three criteria
of programmatic goods, there were at least five programmatic policies
in Sampang’s villages. The first policy was the installment of volunteer
posts to handle matters relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. The second was the distribution of free masks to villagers. The third program
was the transfer of BLT-DD for people from low-income households
and those impacted by the pandemic. The fourth was the distribution of
aid packages, and the fifth was the provision of free internet across the
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villages. The case of Sampang demonstrated the role of village heads in
distributing resources through programmatic politics by meeting three
criteria. These criteria were 1) accuracy in the distribution of policy
benefits; 2) the public nature of the information on the enacted policies; and 3) commitment to implement the formulated policies without
discrimination (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015; Stokes 2009).
This study also discovers that the village heads in Sampang have
acted as effective brokers in distributing programmatic goods from the
supra-village bureaucracy—the head of districts and the bupati—to
tackle the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the relationships between the bupati and village heads have shown to be more
collaborative in maximizing the use of power resources to contain the
spread of the virus. The pandemic has contributed to the shaping of
these collaborative relationships through programmatic politics and
lessened the likelihood for the transactional relations more commonly
associated with non-programmatic politics.
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